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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from an order entered by the Second
Judicial District Court for Weber County, State of Utah, sustaining an action by the Drivers License Division of the State
of Utah revoking plaintiff-appellant's license for refusal to
take a chemical test pursuant to 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 As Amended).

The case was tried without a jury be-

fore the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff-appellant filed suit to avoid an order by the
State Drivers License Division revoking her drivers license
for refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to 41-644.10, Utah Code Annotated (1953 As Amended).
this action, a trial ue nova was held.
-1-

Pursuant to

Plaintiff-appellant
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now appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing plaintiff's petition and sustaining the Drivers License
Divisionfs order revoking her drivers license.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the trial courtfs
ruling that once one is advised of the implied consent law,
"any response other than agreement to take the test is a
constructive refusal".

It is further requested that this

action be remanded to the trial court with instructions to
find that plaintiff-appellant's license is not subject to
revocation under the provisions of 41-6-44.10, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 As Amended) or that plaintiff-appellant is
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 20, 1974, at about 9:00 a.m., Mrs. Hyde
entered the parking lot at St. Benedict's Hospital in
Ogden, Utah, to do volunteer work as a "pink lady" (Tr. 30).
She pulled partially into a parking stall and then backed
up to straighten out her auto. While backing up, she struck
another vehicle (Tr. 31). An off-duty highway patrolman
observed the collision and approached appellant's vehicle.
He proceeded to call the Ogden City Police and physically
restrained appellant when she attempted to walk about in the
parking lot (Tr. 4 ) . The trooper, noticing a smell of "some
-2-
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type of alcoholic beverage11 and after making certain visual
observations, "could tell something was wrong".

He did not

place her under arrest but did force her to return to her
automobile to await the arrival of the Ogden police (Tr* 5 ) .
When officer Ronald K. Nichols of the Ogden Police Department arrived, the trooper related his observations to Officer
Nichols and departed (Tr. 6 ) .
Officer Nichols asked appellant for her drivers license
which she produced from her wallet. She was told to get out
of the vehicle.

She protested, stating that she was on priv-

ate property and they thus had no authority.

She was then

physically removed from her vehicle (Tr. 15). She was placed
under arrest for "driving under the influence of alcohol",
advised of her Miranda rights (Tr. 10), handcuffed and placed
in the back seat of a patrol car (Tr. 9 ) .
Officer Nichols, having less than two months1 experience
on the force (Tr. 22), asked Officer Robert W. Hales to handle
the "implied consent law".

He testified that Officer Hales

entered the back seat with appellant and "tried to give her
the implied consent law" (Tr. 10). Officer Hales testified
that although he went over the implied consent law twice,
"she wouldn't listen". When she responded by stating she
wanted to go home and requested that the handcuffs be removed. Officer Hales advised Officer Nichols "that in mv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mind this was a refusal11 (Tr. 26) .
Officer Nichols then transferred appellant from the
hospital parking lot to the Weber County Jail and Officer
Hales remained behind to investigate the accident•
Officer Nichols requested, and Mrs* Hyde performed,
certain dexterity tests at the jail (Tr. 13)* She was
then allowed to use the telephone to call her husband and
to try unsuccessfully to reach her attorney (Tr. 12, 34).
When appellant finished making her phone calls, Officer
Nichols departed the jail, leaving her in the custody of
the jail matron (Tr. 12). Nothing was said at the jail
concerning the implied consent law or the tests required
thereunder, even though Officer Hales had told Mrs. Hyde
ff

the test would be taken at the jail".

Officer Nichols

went immediately downstairs and filed a refusal report
with the State (Tr. 20).
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS HOLDING THAT ONCE ONE
IS ADVISED OF THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW, "ANY RESPONSE
OTHER THAN AGREEMENT TO TAKE THE TEST IS A CONSTRUCTIVE
REFUSALo"
The trial courtfs holding (Tr. 41) represents a
strict and arbitrary standard not previously recognized
by this court-

It is not justified and should not be
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allowed to stand particularly in the case at bar*
Ao

Mrs. Hyde was not accorded a reasonable time to

comprehend what was being asked of her or to make up her
mind or seek legal counsel.
The report of the refusal shows the time of arrest as
9:45 a.m., and the time of refusal as 9:50 a.m. (Tr. 21).
The record further shows that most of the five minutes
allotted was expended awaiting the arrival of someone more
experienced than the arresting officer, capable of advising
Mrs. Hyde of the implied consent law (Tr. 10).
The officerfs testimony indicates that Officer Hales
made two abortive attempts to explain the implied consent
law to Mrs. Hyde. When she responded by challenging their
right to arrest her and by demanding that they remove her
handcuffs, Officer Hales concluded, nokay, that's a refusal11
(Tr. 18, 26).
Officer Nichols then transported Mrs. Hyde to jail and
filed the refusal report without further discussion of the
implied consent law or request that she submit to a breath
or blood test (Findings of Fact, paragraphs 8 and 10). It
is significant to note that upon arrival at the jail Mrs*
Hyde was asked to perform certain dexterity tests and she
fully complied with these requests (Tr. 13). The officers
had testified that she had been told that she would be
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given the tests desired under the implied consent law at
the jail.

However, no personnel were called or present to

administer either the blood or breathalizer tests.

It is

clear that Officer Nichols accepted in total Officer Hales1
conclusion that they had a refusal out at the scereof the
arrest and had no need to renew their warnings or requests
at the time when the tests could in fact have been administered.
There is no indication in the record that either
Officer Nichols or Hales suggested to Mrs. Hyde that she
might want to consult an attorney before deciding whether
or not to take the tests being offered her (Tr. 25, 26).
When she arrived at the jail, she was allowed to make some
phone calls and tried unsuccessfully to contact her attorney
(Tr. 34). Even if she had reached an attorney and been
advised to take the tests, she apparently would have had
no opportunity to

f,

reconsidern the refusal entered earlier.

In Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P.2d 1258
(1969) at 879, this court concluded that after one has
been advised as to rights under this statute and the consequences of his refusal to submit to a test, he still has a
"reasonable time in which to make up his mind and to seek
legal counsel11. Clearly, no such opportunity or courtesy
was extended Mrs. Hyde.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The State failed to produce any evidence that

Mrs, Hyde knowingly and intentionally refused to take
the test.
It is quite clear from the record that Mrs. Hyde
did not comprehend what Officer Hales was saying regarding the implied consent law. According to the police
account, she said she wasnft going to listen (Tr. 17)
and they acknowledge that she did not (Tr. 26) 0 She made
no statements indicating that she understood what was
being asked of her.

All of her utterances dealt with the

propriety of her arrest (Tr. 16). The arresting officer
admitted that at no time did she specifically say anything
akin to "I will not take any test11 (Tr. 17, 28).
Mrs. Hyde testified that she had no familiarity with
the implied consent law prior to her arrest (Tr. 31) and
was not aware that she had been offered or had refused the
tests (Tr. 32). She stated that the first she heard of
the alleged refusal was around September 12, approximately
20 days after her arrest, when she received a notice from
the State of Utah (Trc 35)•
The officers repeatedly made reference to her emotional
condition and she at various times described her condition
while talking to them as "uncomfortable11, "frightened11,
"terriblv unset", and "confused" (Tr. 38}.
*
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0

«

*
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tier condition should not have been unexpected.

She

.„^.ij.

I
—

was a fifty-five year-old lady (Tr. 34) involved in an
accident.

She was accused of being intoxicated prior to

10:00 in the morning and physically restrained from reporting to her place of work (Trc 32). She had been manhandled
first by a highway patrolman forcing her to re-enter her
automobile (Tr. 5) and then by Officers Nichols and Johnson
when removing her from the same automobile (Tr. 8 ) . She
had suffered the indignity of being arrested, handcuffed,
read her "Miranda" rights and forced to sit on public display in the back seat of a patrol car for approximately
five minutes awaiting the arrival of someone allegedly
qualified to handle advising her of the implied consent
law (Tr. 10, 15).
C. Mrs. Hyde's response was not an unequivocal rejection or a constructive refusal of the tests.
Whether or not Mrs. Hyde was legally correct in her
contention that the officers had no right to arrest her
on private property need not be determined.

Certainly,

under the circumstances, her attempts to protest the
police action did not constitute the type of unequivocal
rejection of the tests necessary to

excuse the officers

from supplying further information to her.

See Rust v.

Department of Public Vehiclesy 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1963)•
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence fails to establish that Mrs. Hyde
knowingly and intentionally refused to take the test
requested.

She was not accorded reasonable time to compre-

hend what was being asked of her or to make up her mind or
seek legal counsel.

Furthermore, her responses did not

constitute the type of unequivocal rejection of the tests
necessary to excuse the officers from supplying further
information to her.

The trial courtfs finding of a

"constructive refusal11 under these circumstances should not
be allowed to stando
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM Do MARSH
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
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